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BREak THE glaSS. A provision in New York 
State’s policies and procedures that refers 
to the ability of a health care provider or 
other authorized user to access a patient’s 
Protected Health Information (PHI) without 
obtaining patient consent. NYS policies allow 
a provider to “break the glass” in the case of a 
medical emergency where a patient is unable 
to give consent to access his or her health 
information.
COVEREd ENTITY. Those entities that are required 
to comply with federal health information 
privacy rules under HIPAA, which defi nes a 
“covered entity” as (1) a health plan, (2) a 
health care clearinghouse, or (3) a health 
care provider who transmits any health 
information in electronic form for insurance or 
reimbursement purposes.
daTa MININg. A process of pulling pieces of data 
from a database or electronic network in order 
to look for patterns and relationships. In the 
context of health information technology, 
data mining can be used for public health 
purposes, for example, to identify patterns 
that reveal an epidemic. But it can also be used 
for marketing purposes to determine where to 
focus promotional campaigns.
daTa SEgREgaTION/gRaNUlaR CONTROl. 
The ability to separate out or sequester health 
information, sometimes based on specially 
protected sensitive health information but 
not always. Data segregation or granular 
control 1) allows patients to exert some 
control over the type and level of information 
that can be shared; 2) restricts information 
access to specifi c individuals or entities; and 
3) establishes preferences for time frame and/
or duration during which specifi c information 
can be electronically accessed.
EHR (Electronic Health Record). A digital version of 
the traditional paper-based medical record for 
an individual either kept within a single facility, 
such as a doctor’s offi  ce or a clinic (sometimes 
referred to as an electronic medical record 
or EMR), or the offi  cial health record for an 
individual that is shared among providers, 
facilities and agencies. 
HEal-NY. New York State passed the Health Care 
Effi  ciency and Aff ordability Law for New Yorkers 
Capital Grant Program in 2004, often referred 
to as the HEAL NY Program, to support 
the development and implementation of 
New York’s health information technology 
infrastructure.  
HIE (Health Information Exchange). Generic 
term for any system that facilitates 
electronic exchange of medical information.  
Alternatively, HIE refers to the act of 
transmitting or exchanging electronic 
medical information among facilities, health 
information organizations (HIOs) or HIEs, and 
government agencies. 
HIO (Health Information Organization). An 
entity that facilitates electronic exchange 
of medical information. A HIO is one type of 
HIE; for example, a RHIO, or Regional Health 
Information Organization, is an HIE.
HIPaa. The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) was enacted by 
Congress is 1996. The HIPAA Privacy Rule (45 
CFR Part 160 and Subparts A and E of Part 164) 
regulates the use and disclosure of personal 
gloSSarY oF terMS
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health information (or Protected Health 
Information) held by “covered entities.” 
HIT (Health Information Technology). The storage, 
retrieval, exchange and use of health 
information in an electronic environment. 
HITECH. Enacted as part of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the 
Health Information Technology for Economic 
and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act is designed 
to promote the widespread adoption and 
standardization of health information 
technology. HITECH required the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) to amend 
the HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Enforcement 
Rules to strengthen privacy and security 
protections for electronic health information 
sharing.
IT (Information Technology). The development, 
implementation, and maintenance of 
computer hardware and software systems 
to organize and communicate information 
electronically.
NCVHS. The National Committee on Vital and Health 
Statistics (NCVHS) was established by Congress 
to serve as an advisory body to the Department 
of Health and Human Services on health data, 
statistics and national health information 
policy. 
NwHIN. The Nationwide Health Information Network 
(NwHIN) is sometimes described as a “network 
of networks” that allows participants (state 
level exchanges, federal entities, public health 
entities and health information organizations) 
to locate and exchange health information 
electronically. The initiative is sponsored by the 
Office of the National Coordinator (ONC) for 
Health Information Technology, which began 
developing the NwHIN in 2004. 
NYeC (The New York eHealth Collaborative). A 
state designated not-for-profit public-private 
partnership and statewide policy body formed 
in 2006 that is charged with the development 
of policies and procedures governing the 
implementation of the electronic exchange of 
health information in New York State. 
OHITT. New York State’s Office of Health Information 
Technology Transformation (OHITT) was created 
in 2007 by the New York State Department 
of Health to coordinate New York’s Health 
Information Technology efforts.
PHI (Protected Health Information).  PHI is defined 
by HIPPA (federal law) as any information 
held by a covered entity that concerns health 
status, provision of health care, or payment for 
health care that can be linked to an individual. 
This is interpreted rather broadly and includes 
any part of an individual’s medical record or 
payment history. 
PHR (Personal Health Record). An electronic health 
record maintained by a patient that includes, 
for example, patient-reported data, as well 
as physician-generated data and lab results 
(either entered by the patient or downloaded 
from the lab itself ). A PHR differs from an EHR, 
which is maintained by provider or a health 
information exchange. 
RHIO (Regional Health Information Organization). 
A group of organizations within a specific 
geographical area that share health care-
related information electronically. A RHIO 
typically oversees the means of information 
exchange and develops health information 
technology (HIT) standards. 
SHIN-NY (Statewide Health Information Network 
for New York). Described as an “information 
superhighway,” the SHIN-NY is the 
technological infrastructure being designed by 
New York to facilitate the exchange of health 
information between and among providers, 
consumers, payers and government agencies.
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Who gets to see your medical history?
Until the advent of electronic health information exchange, patients had the 
ability to control which providers had access to what information about their 
medical history. Even when a patient consented to allow a new provider to 
access her records, what information went into those records depended on 
what the patient wanted to tell her doctor, and then what the doctor chose to 
send to the new provider. Unless exchange networks are carefully designed,  
electronic health records that can be shared at the click of a mouse can 




Traditional patient privacy controls
Patient privacy in an electronic world
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Electronic health information technology is transforming the health care system as we know it. Like many aspects of our lives, the 
medical offi  ce is going online. Doctors, health sys-
tems, insurers, care coordination systems, regulators, 
governments and patients themselves are demand-
ing electronic access to health records. Near instan-
taneous sharing of information between and among 
health care providers promises signifi cant benefi ts 
to both doctors and patients, including greater 
coordination and effi  ciency in service delivery, 
reductions in medical errors and misdiagnoses, and 
convenience. Th ese benefi ts are also likely to im-
prove the effi  ciency and eff ectiveness of the health 
care system more broadly. 
However, this step forward poses significant 
risks. Easily shareable electronic records threaten 
patient privacy, and can lead to security breaches, 
misuse of information, and most importantly, loss 
of patient control over confidential and sensitive 
health information. This threatens the confiden-
tial communication between doctors and patients 
that has been a bedrock principle of modern 
medicine. Confidentiality ensures that patients 
seek out care, and that they are open and hon-
est with their providers. Fully informed by the 
totality of a patient’s circumstances, providers can 
render the best care possible.1 Patients who fear 
a loss of control over their private medical infor-
mation may lose faith in their doctor—and in the 
health care system. They may fail to share critical 
information with their treating providers or they 
may avoid treatment altogether. 
Guaranteeing confi dentiality and patient control 
over sensitive health information is critical to the 
success of electronic health information exchange. 
Only with confi dence that personal medical infor-
mation will be shared in ways that benefi t them and 
not cause them harm will patients fully engage in 
this promising technological advancement.
New York State has taken a national leadership 
role in transforming the manner in which patients’ 
records are created and shared. Hard-copy docu-
ments and electronic records stored in an offi  ce 
computer are now being converted into a compre-
hensive, statewide network of integrated, searchable 
databases—with the goal of ultimately linking to a 
future nationwide health information network. 
A growing information-sharing network, guided by 
the New York eHealth Collaborative, a public-pri-
vate partnership funded by the New York State De-
partment of Health, has invested more than $840 
million towards developing health information 
exchanges, or HIEs. A dozen existing HIE networks 
will eventually permit providers and payers to gain 
access to a patient’s aggregated medical records in 
New York State and, ultimately, connect New York’s 
HIEs with a national network. 
Th e state has endorsed a set of privacy and security 
policies and procedures for the implementation 
of health information exchange.2 But these poli-
cies have signifi cant fl aws that pose challenges to 
the integrity of electronic record-sharing in New 
York State. Most signifi cantly, these policies do not 
allow for patient control over the inclusion of their 
health information in the network. In addition, 
the technological infrastructure used by the state’s 
HIEs represents an all-or-nothing approach: Once 
a patient consents to allowing a provider to gain ac-
cess to his or her medical records, the provider sees 
everything that was ever entered into the network 
about that patient, regardless of whether the infor-
mation is relevant to current treatment.
iNtrodUCtioN
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The New York Civil Liberties Union supports 
electronic sharing of medical records, but takes the 
position that patients must be able to control who 
has access to their medical information. Patients 
must also be assured that those who do have access 
receive only information that is relevant to their 
treatment. Otherwise, those in need of medical 
care may be reluctant to seek it or to give providers 
consent to review their medical records. Patients 
will have confidence in the state’s approach to 
electronic health information exchange where 
vigorous informed consent requirements and 
specific limitations on information-sharing protect 
sensitive information and ensure individual control 
of personal medical records. 
The New York State Department of Health, the 
NYeHealth Collaborative, and the New York State 
Legislature must take steps to protect individual 
privacy and autonomy as the state develops a cen-
tralized electronic exchange of health and medi-
cal information. The NYCLU offers the following 
recommendations in support of this goal.
n  Give Patients and Providers Control Over 
Access to, and Sharing of, Medical Records. 
Information-sharing data systems must be 
designed to sort and segregate medical informa-
tion to comply with privacy protections guaran-
teed under New York State and federal laws. At 
present they do not. Without such protections, 
people who receive medical care that requires 
strict confidentiality—for example, treatment of 
conditions to which stigma attaches—and the 
providers who deliver that care may choose not 
to share medical records in order to protect pri-
vacy. This increases the risk of harm to patients 
and to the general public.  
n Offer Patients the Right to Opt-Out Altogether. 
The state must adopt a policy that requires 
providers to offer patients the option of de-
clining to participate in health information 
exchange altogether, or at least ensure that a 
patient’s identifying information is not ac-
cessible by those who have not obtained the 
specific consent of the patient. 
n Require Patient Consent Forms to Offer 
Clear Information-Sharing Options. The 
state must revisit its policy on consent to allow 
greater patient control over how medical infor-
mation is shared. Consent forms should offer 
patients three distinct options: to opt-in and 
allow providers access to their electronic medi-
cal records, to opt-out except in the event of a 
medical emergency, or to opt-out altogether. 
n Require Notice to Patients When Their  
Providers Become Data Suppliers. The state 
must adopt a policy mandating that providers 
notify patients when the provider links to an 
HIE. In the absence of consent to upload patient 
information, patients must be notified when 
information about them from their provider 
initially becomes accessible through an HIE.  
n Guarantee the Right of Patients to Correct 
and Amend Information. Current law permits 
patients to review and submit amendments 
to medical records held by individual provid-
ers. The practice of correction and amendment 
must be adapted to ensure that a correction to 
any error is automatically sent to any provider 
who has previously accessed the patient’s medi-
cal record through an HIE.  
n Prohibit, and Sanction, the Misuse of Medical 
Information. The state should adopt a policy 
that prohibits, and strongly sanctions, the 
misuse of patient medical information obtained 
through an HIE. New York’s current all-or-noth-
ing data-sharing system gives providers access 
to all of a patient’s medical records—regardless 
of how old the information or how relevant it is 
for current treatment. New York must protect 
patients from bad actors: that small minority 
of providers who may abuse information out of 
fear, prejudice or malice. 
n Mandate Redisclosure Prohibitions for Third 
Parties. Current state policies do not require 
HIEs to warn those who access patient health 
information that redisclosing sensitive medical 
information without patient consent violates the 
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law. State policy should require HIEs to explic-
itly communicate to third parties that redisclo-
sure is prohibited and that there are penalties for 
violating this prohibition.
n Prohibit Health Information Exchanges from 
Selling Data. The New York State Legislature 
should pass legislation prohibiting HIEs from 
selling patients’ private health information; this 
prohibition should apply to records with or 
without a patient’s personal identifiers. Medical 
information must not be used to target indi-
viduals or providers for promotional pitches 
or advertising campaigns; nor should HIEs be 
allowed to profit from the sales and marketing 
opportunities created by the release of informa-
tion in patients’ medical records. 
n Carefully Regulate the Use of Commercial 
Vendors of Personal Health Records. A num-
ber of commercial vendors now offer patients 
the ability to collect, store and manage their own 
medical information online. State and federal 
confidentiality restrictions may not apply to 
information held by these commercial vendors. 
If commercially available health records systems 
are offered to New Yorkers as a way for them 
to access and manage their own health infor-
mation, the state must require that patients be 
warned of privacy risks. Patients must also be 
given access to their records without having to 
resort to a commercial vendor. 
n Step Up Public Outreach Efforts. Public health 
officials must fully inform New Yorkers about 
the implementation of health information 
exchanges (HIEs) in New York State. Under 
current state policy, patient medical information 
is linked to the system without patient notice or 
consent. Patients require a better understanding 
of what is at stake. This requires clear informed 
consent mechanisms and a robust public educa-
tion program that explains to people what they 
need to know about electronic medical records 
exchange before a visit to the doctor’s office.
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The art of medicine faces a technological re-invention as record-keeping moves from file cabinets and desk drawers to a web 
of interconnected computer database systems. 
As cumbersome paper records are supplanted 
by ostensibly secure electronic networks, physi-
cians, insurers, health care coordination systems, 
regulators, governments and patients themselves 
are eager for rapid electronic access to health 
records. Accordingly, New York State has begun 
to transform the procedures by which patient 
records are created, stored and shared. Hard-copy 
documents, once stashed in a folder or stored in 
an office computer, are now being converted into 
a comprehensive, statewide electronic network of 
integrated, searchable databases that will one day 
link to a national health information network. 
Since 2004, New York State has been working to 
develop electronic health information exchanges 
(HIEs) via the New York eHealth Collaborative, a 
public-private partnership funded by the New York 
State Department of Health. In many parts of the 
state, shareable electronic health record systems 
are already up and running. Twelve regional health 
information organizations (RHIOs) in New York 
permit providers to share patient records with 
other providers in their networks. Eventually, all 
of New York’s RHIOs will be linked to a statewide 
health information network (or SHIN-NY).3 Other 
types of health information organizations will be 
able to access this network, and it will soon become 
directly accessible by individual providers. 
Rapid information sharing promises significant 
benefits to health care providers and patients. The 
advent of electronic information exchange will also 
benefit the health care system. Services can be bet-
ter coordinated and more efficiently delivered, and 
the incidence of medical errors and misdiagnoses 
can be reduced as information becomes more ac-
cessible and convenient for both patients and pro-
viders. But networked electronic records create the 
potential for security breaches,4 misuse of informa-
tion, and loss of patient control over confidential 
and sensitive health information. 
Privacy protection and informed patient consent 
must be the foundational principles of a fair, effec-
tive electronic health information exchange. With-
out guarantees of privacy, shared networks will 
fail.5 If private medical information is vulnerable 
to public dissemination and inspection, medi-
cal consumers may avoid care. And if significant 
numbers of patients decline to participate, the 
personal and public health benefits of HIE will be 
diminished. The potential for public backlash is 
great—one need look no further than the periodic 
public uproar over changes in Facebook’s privacy 
practices as an example.6 Robust and enforce-
able privacy protections and consent procedures 
must be in place from the start in order to ensure 
patient confidence.   
What Came Before 
Patient privacy has been paramount in medical 
care at least since Hippocrates’ famous oath, which 
impels physicians to keep confidential any informa-
tion obtained in the course of treating a patient.7 
Until very recently, patient information was kept 
in physical form; thus, safeguarding privacy was 
relatively simple. To share patient information 
with another provider, the doctor would secure 
the patient’s permission, copy the relevant portion 
of the patient’s file and send it along. Consent was 
required for each communication, and the patient 
retained the ability to control which providers had 
Part 1: the New world of electronic  
 Health information exchange 
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access to what information. Even when records 
were shared, the information that went into those 
records was limited by what the patient wanted to 
tell the doctor; and subsequently what the doctor 
chose to send to another provider. A patient visit-
ing a podiatrist might understandably choose not 
to disclose his prior psychotherapy, for example. 
When asked about past surgeries, he may share 
that he’s had an appendectomy but omit mention of 
hemorrhoid surgery.  
Moreover, the actual sharing of records by doc-
tors has always involved a second screening step. 
Doctors and facilities rarely if ever transmit entire 
patient records to a second provider—they omit 
extraneous information, and they frequently safe-
guard sensitive information at the request of the 
patient. As in the example above, the general prac-
titioner would inform the podiatrist of a diabetes 
diagnosis, but would not pass on the name, or even 
the existence, of the patient’s psychotherapist—if 
the general practitioner even knew it.
Indeed, the confidentiality of individual medical 
records has long been mandated by professional 
practice standards, and by federal and state laws. 
All modern medical schools administer oaths that 
impose the duty of confidentiality on physicians.8 
Nationally, a basic right to confidentiality was 
codified in federal law in the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (or HIPAA);9 
even stronger protections were extended by the 
recent American Reinvestment and Recovery 
Act.10 Additional privacy safeguards protect 
specific categories of sensitive information like 
family planning services, substance abuse treat-
ment and genetic testing.11 Federal laws set the 
minimum standard; state laws frequently impose 
even more stringent confidentiality protections.12 
All of these patient privacy protections are rooted 
in the understanding that compromising patient 
privacy means compromising individual care and 
the public health. 
New York State has long been a national leader in 
protecting the confidentiality of personal medical 
information. State law has strict privacy stan-
dards for medical records.13 Unlike HIPAA, New 
York requires patient consent before a physician 
can disclose an individual’s medical informa-
tion to another treating physician.14 It also limits 
disclosure to immediately relevant information.15 
Even stronger protections restrict the release of 
certain especially sensitive information regarding 
genetic tests,16 mental health,17 medical treatment 
of adolescents18 sexually transmitted infections19 
and HIV.20 
Maintaining Privacy Protections in the 
Face of New Technology  
Advances in technology do not void existing state 
laws or eclipse the ethical concerns that gave rise 
to those laws. Rapidly evolving information tech-
nology requires that the state undertake a compre-
hensive in-depth analysis to determine (1) whether 
current policies and procedures governing HIEs 
comply with existing laws; and (2) whether laws 
protecting the confidentiality of patients’ medical 
information are sufficient in light of new techno-
logical capabilities. 
New York State laws governing personal medical 
information were drafted for the world of paper re-
cords; inherent in these laws is a presumption that 
patients control the dissemination of their medical 
records and that a physical “human filter” in the 
doctor’s office decides what information is shared 
with third parties. Electronic systems that share 
entire records at the click of a mouse cannot help 
but undermine these controls. 
Nowadays, the challenge of protecting confidential-
ity is exacerbated by the complexity of the modern 
health care system where records migrate beyond 
the confines of the doctor’s office. Existing law has 
been amended to require that medical information 
is kept confidential not only by the doctor but by 
the array of other entities that have access to private 
medical information: HMOs, the laboratories that 
process medical tests, the hospital system in which 
the doctor participates, the doctor’s or hospital’s 
records management company, the patient’s insur-
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ance company, and the medical underwriter who 
insures that insurance company.21 
Failing to extend the strong medical privacy 
protections that exist in current law to electronic 
health information exchange creates a serious risk 
of harm to individual patients. However, the great-
est danger is to public health in the broadest sense. 
Should patients decline to give their providers ac-
cess to their medical records, misrepresent medical 
information or avoid treatment altogether, New 
York may lose both the individual and commu-
nity-wide benefits health information technology 
promises. Both individual patient records and 
aggregated public health data will be increasingly 
susceptible to error due to incomplete or inac-
curate information. Doctors may unwittingly base 
diagnoses on false or misleading information, 
leading to treatment decisions that are not in the 
patient’s best interest—or that cause actual harm. 
Data compiled for the purpose of analyzing public 
health issues will be skewed, underreporting in-
formation from the records of those patients with 
greater privacy concerns. In turn, this phenom-
enon would lead to the flawed assessment of public 
health problems and trends. 
Americans want their medical information—
whether in paper or electronic form—to be held 
in private with their medical providers.22 Most 
patients expect that medical privacy is far more 
vigorously protected by law than it actually is.23 
All health care consumers have an interest in the 
confidentiality of their medical records; but for 
some, privacy safeguards are essential when they 
seek treatment and services for sensitive health care 
issues related to HIV/AIDS diagnosis and treat-
ment, reproductive health, substance abuse, mental 
health, genetic conditions, sexual assault, and do-
mestic violence.24 Minors seeking care have perhaps 
the greatest need of assurance that their medical 
information will be held in confidence.25 Studies 
indicate that minors will avoid or delay seeking 
care if they believe that their parents will find out.26 
As records become electronically linked—office 
to office, region to region and ultimately state to 
state—the need to ensure that adequate privacy 
protections are in place grows in proportion to the 
sheer number of people, including legions of non-
medical personnel, who have push-button access to 
a patient’s entire medical history.  
New concerns will arise as electronic networks al-
low patients direct access to their own medical re-
cords, via provider-created portals or through con-
tracts with free-standing Personal Health Record 
(PHR) systems such as Microsoft Health Vault.27 
Patients may also have access through smart phone 
applications and other means not yet envisioned.28 
These powerful tools will permit patients to iden-
tify and correct errors in their records, collate and 
track their own health information retained in 
multiple sources, and ultimately enter their own 
health-behavior information in electronic data-
bases.29 Some regional health information organi-
zations have already considered providing patients 
access to their own health information via the use 
of commercially-available PHRs.
The proliferation of personal health records raises 
questions about privacy that have been largely 
unexamined and wholly unresolved. Which sorts 
of records are governed by New York State privacy 
laws, which by HIPAA, and which by the Federal 
Trade Commission? Can patients rely on the same 
protections of medical information held by PHRs 
as they do for information held within a doctor’s 
file cabinet or computer? What protections do pa-
tients have against disclosure or data mining30 by a 
third-party vendor of a smart phone app when the 
vendor may not be required to comply with fed-
eral privacy standards?31 Would such information 
be protected if requested pursuant to subpoena? 
What if records are accessed or downloaded by a 
patient on his or her employer’s computer? New 
York State must thoughtfully and deliberately 
consider the issues raised before entering this 
uncharted territory.
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Efforts to create a network of shared electronic health records began in earnest in April 2004 with an executive order from the Bush 
administration setting adoption of interoper-
able electronic health records by 2014 as a na-
tional goal.32 The executive order also established 
the Office of the National Coordinator for Health 
Information Technology in the Department of 
Health and Human Services, and a strategic 
plan and funding streams for state and national 
HIE programs.
During the Bush years, national policy for de-
veloping an electronic medical records system 
focused largely on market-based, free-enterprise 
strategies and on initiatives undertaken by indi-
vidual states. The Obama administration brought 
significant resources to this undertaking—in-
cluding funding, policy guidance and national 
organization—through the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
Act (HITECH), passed in February 2009.33 While 
HITECH greatly increased funding for health 
information technology, it also transformed the 
federal government’s approach to privacy and 
consent, establishing new protections for person-
al health privacy and substantially extending the 
limited protections of HIPPA.34  
New York State’s health information technology 
initiatives also date to 2004, with passage of the 
Health Care Efficiency and Affordability Law for 
New Yorkers Capital Grant Program (HEAL NY).35 
HEAL NY’s primary objective was “implementing 
a 21st Century health information infrastructure.”36 
New York State established the Office of Health 
Information Technology Transformation in 2007 to 
begin “building an infrastructure to share clinical 
information between patients, providers, payers 
and public health entities.” This infrastructure will 
ultimately be integrated into a statewide network 
and into the planned national network.37 New York 
State has since invested more than $840 million to 
develop HIT networks throughout the state.38 A 
state-funded grant program now funds 12 Regional 
Health Information Networks (RHIOs) that facili-
tate patient record-sharing.39 At present, more than 
65,000 health care providers participate in RHIOs.40
As New York State began to develop the health in-
formation exchange, the state introduced a process 
for developing policies and procedures that govern 
patient consent and privacy.41 Stakeholder meetings 
took place even as some RHIOs recruited providers 
and patients. The accelerated policy development 
process left little time for careful consideration of 
policy debates about privacy and consent happen-
ing at the federal level and across the country, or of 
rapidly evolving technological capabilities. 
 
The state’s operational plan acknowledges that 
“New York State currently has a fragmented legal 
and regulatory framework for the exchange of 
Health Information.”42 Nevertheless, New York has 
not carried out a comprehensive analysis of state 
law as it relates to the state’s own HIE policies and 
procedures governing patients’ privacy interests.43 
Likewise, the state has not provided any legal 
analysis or guidance to RHIOs, HIEs or providers 
to ensure that they implement HIE in ways that 
comply with existing law.44 
New York faces a daunting challenge: creating an 
electronic information exchange while making 
prudent choices in design and policy that en-
sure compliance with state and federal laws, and 
incorporating evolving technological capacity to 
segregate and protect patient data. This balancing act 
Part 2:  developing New York’s electronic  
 Health information exchange 
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is no small feat. However, two early, critical policy 
choices made by the statewide collaborative process 
have created significant problems affecting elec-
tronic record sharing in the state: (1) an inadequate 
patient consent protocol that gives patients little 
choice in whether and how to participate in health 
information exchange; and (2) an all-or-nothing 
approach to data sharing that prevents participat-
ing patients from controlling the dissemination of 
their medical information.
Patient Consent to Inclusion and Use  
of Medical Records in an Electronic  
Information Exchange
Administrators of an HIE could employ any one 
of a variety of patient-consent models to allow 
for greater or lesser deference to patients’ wishes 
regarding the inclusion of their medical informa-
tion in a network and the ability of providers or 
other entities to gain access to that information.45 
Most models give some measure of control to pa-
tients—an option to “opt-in” or to “opt-out.” With 
opt-in models, patients must do just that—provide 
explicit consent that their records can be linked to 
a network or electronically accessed. In an opt-out 
model, all patient records are automatically shared 
unless the patient opts out by electing to withdraw 
from the program. New York State describes its 
patient consent protocol as an opt-in model,46 but 
it is actually a hybrid that incorporates elements of 
the two models just described.
There are two stages in New York’s protocol for 
establishing access to electronic medical records: 
First, patients are linked to a patient registry (or 
patient locator system) and their records become 
accessible through an HIE. Second, a provider or 
other entity seeks access to those records. When a 
health care provider joins an HIE, information that 
identifies each of the provider’s patients is automat-
ically linked to a search system that permits those 
who have access to the network to identify patients 
in the network. Identifying information could be 
demographic (an address) or some kind of unique 
patient identifier. At this point, patient information 
is accessible through the HIE. Patient consent is 
not sought at this stage.47 
New York, in effect, requires the automatic en-
rollment of all patients of providers participating 
in an HIE. Patients may not opt out (and there-
fore their identifying information is available to 
those with access to the network); and they are 
not notified that their information is now avail-
able through the HIE.
New York employs an element of the opt-in mod-
el once a provider or other entity seeks access to 
a patient’s information through the HIE. In the 
course of ordinary treatment, a patient’s affirma-
tive consent is required before a provider can 
access that patient’s records through the HIE.48 
Generally, patients are presented with a consent 
form for release of their medical information 
with the paperwork filled out upon arriving in 
a provider’s office, along with a pamphlet that 
explains the benefits of the electronic record-
sharing program and provides a short statement 
about potential risks.49 
New York State has adopted a model consent form, 
but HIEs across the state may use a variation of 
this form provided it conforms to basic minimum 
standards.50 The consent form asks the patient to 
opt-in—to permit the provider to access all of the 
patient’s records available throughout the network. 
In addition, New York’s model patient-consent 
form cautions patients that by placing their signa-
ture on the form, they surrender any and all rights 
under New York and federal law regarding the dis-
semination of, and access to, sensitive information 
in their medical records that is accessible through 
an HIE.51  
Patient consent, in this context, serves as blanket 
permission to release all medical information, 
notwithstanding the type of treatment received; 
the date it was provided; the facility at which 
treatment was received; or even the relevance 
to the medical condition for which treatment is 
sought. (See discussion of patient control and 
granularity below.) What’s more, depending on 
the consent form used by the HIE, the patient 
may be consenting to access by affiliated provid-
ers as well—ranging from the doctor’s practice, a 
hospital, affiliated health facilities or to all pro-
viders in the network.52 
On the surface, the distinction between mandatory 
inclusion of patient information in an HIE and the 
option to allow a provider access to that informa-
tion may seem slight. However, there are two key 
issues to consider: First, some patients may seek 
to avoid being included in a patient locator system 
by going to a provider who is not enrolled in the 
network or by paying for services out of pocket.53 
Some may refuse care altogether to avoid being 
part of a state or national “listing.”54 Second, and, 
perhaps more important, some patients may face 
actual harm from inclusion in a patient registry 
that reveals demographic information such as a 
residential address.  
The linking of one’s medical records to an elec-
tronic network may provoke fear of unauthorized 
access or breach that could allow a hacker to gain 
access to patient identities or entire medical histo-
ries—either as a wholesale medical records theft or 
in pursuit of information about a specific patient. 
And this fear may be well founded. The mere inclu-
sion of demographic information in a directory of 
existing records, regardless of whether complete 
medical records are made accessible, can pose an 
unacceptable risk to patients. Take, for example, 
those patients at risk of domestic violence, harass-
ment, stalking or with other special concerns about 
confidentiality, such as public figures or crime 
victims.55 The ability to glean an address or indeed 
any information that may reveal a patient’s location 
may cause irreparable harm. 
New York maintains that this two-stage process 
satisfies the myriad laws that require patient 
consent before information can be shared with a 
third party.56 This is highly debatable. Informed 
consent requires prior notice that is clearly com-
municated: presenting the consent form amidst a 
sheaf of insurance documents, HIPAA releases and 
other paperwork fails to meet this basic criterion. 
What’s more, the automatic disclosure of patient 
identifying information to an HIE most likely 
constitutes a violation of New York State law, which 
requires patient consent whenever patient informa-
tion (including patient identifying information) is 
disclosed to a third party.57 
In many respects New York’s patient consent proto-
col represents a radical departure from current law 
and practice. The protocol effectively eviscerates 
decades of carefully considered and crafted law, 
replacing special consent requirements and con-
fidentiality protections for information related to 
sensitive conditions such as HIV, substance abuse 
and others with one all-or-nothing consent form.58
New York’s share-first, ask-later approach is based 
on a questionable interpretation of the law.59 Under 
this reading of the law, HIEs and RHIOs would be 
exempt from rules regarding third-party disclosure 
because they are considered “practitioners or other 
personnel employed by or under contract with the 
facility[.]”60 To date, no case law recognizes orga-
nizations like HIEs and RHIOs as exempt from the 
prohibitions against third party disclosure. There 
is, however, a considerable body of law that up-
holds the restriction on dissemination of patients’ 
records to third parties.61 
A new patient-consent protocol
Once provided with information and guidance re-
garding health information exchange, patients must 
be afforded clear options regarding the inclusion of 
their identifying information and medical records 
in an electronic health information network, and 
for sharing that information.
In light of the concerns outlined here, it is the posi-
tion of the NYCLU that the state should revisit its 
policy on uploading individual medical information 
to a shared network and adopt a requirement that 
such information cannot be uploaded without af-
firmative patient consent. Should the state reject this 
reform, it should at least allow patients to affirma-
tively opt out of the system at any time so that their 
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BREakINg THE glaSS:  
PaTIENT PRIVaCY IN a MEdICal EMERgENCY 
In a medical emergency where a patient is unable to authorize access to his or her medical records, 
New York’s policy purports to create a limited exception to the law that patient consent is required 
before the release of such records. Under the state’s “break the glass” policy, a provider who asserts a 
need to see a patient’s medical record in such an emergency can access the patient’s entire medical 
records without consent.64 In addition to the lack of clear authority to promulgate such an exception, 
the “break the glass” exception poses myriad problems. Even sensitive medical information subject 
to specific state and federal confidentiality protections may be accessed, regardless of whether the 
provider needs to see such information in order to treat the patient. 
In all circumstances, New York law requires patient consent before medical information can be 
released to a third party; there is no “emergency” exception to the law’s straightforward requirement.65 
Patients and providers may see the value in giving an emergency care doctor access to medical 
information that could improve patient care. However, only the legislature has the authority to 
create an exception under the law for emergency care. Should the legislature choose to do so, such 
an exception should be limited to allowing providers access to only that information that is relevant 
to the emergency.
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medical information is not included in the network. 
Patients should also be afforded the opportunity to 
mask or exclude demographic information from a 
patient registry or locator system while retaining 
the ability to share medical records with specific 
providers.62 Indeed, one can easily choose to have 
an unlisted telephone number; why not have “un-
listed” medical records as well?
Once a patient’s medical information is included 
in the network, the state should offer three  
clear options regarding provider access to  
such information:63
Opt in: Patients consent to make information 
in their medical records available to specific, 
designated providers through electronic infor-
mation networks.
Opt out: Patients prohibit under all circum-
stances access to their medical information 
through electronic information networks.
Opt out with exception: Patients consent to 
make information in their medical records 
available through electronic information net-
works only in the case of a medical emergency.   
In addition to offering these patient consent  
options, patients must be notified in advance of a 
provider’s joining an electronic records exchange. 
This notice must clearly explain the manner in 
which electronic medical records will be ac-
cessible, as well as the steps a patient can take 
to exclude or limit the release of their medical 
information through an HIE. This same notice 
requirement should apply when the network of 
providers with access expands, as for example, 
when a hospital that has previously obtained 
consent from a patient adds new affiliates. Under 
current consent policies, these affiliated providers 
may gain access to the patient’s records. It should 
not be left to the patient to continually check a 
website to find out whether new providers have 
joined an exchange network.
The state’s justification for this policy appears to be based on another section of the public health 
law, which in fact only permits an exception for providing emergency treatment in the absence of 
informed consent,66 not access to records. Even if the law could be interpreted to give a provider access 
to medical information by virtue of his authority to treat without informed consent, the provider 
would only be entitled to information material to emergency treatment. But the infrastructure of 
New York’s network (an “all-or-nothing” approach to information sharing, as described herein) does 
not provide a means to separate out and allow access to only that information that is directly 
relevant to emergency treatment.
New York’s model consent form allows patients to decline consent for medical providers to access 
their electronic medical records in a medical emergency. But exercising this option is predicated 
on knowing that the network—and the break the glass policy—exists. Patients are likely unaware 
that their demographic information is electronically accessible or that their medical information 
can be accessed in an emergency without their consent. Consider the patient whose doctor links 
his practice to the electronic network the day after the patient’s annual visit. The patient will not 
learn that his records are part of an electronic system until his next annual check-up, a year later. 
The only routine opportunity a patient has to decline provider access to her medical records in a 
break the glass scenario will be during some later medical visit long after the records have become 
accessible through the system.
Individuals may not fully appreciate the potential 
harm in having their health information accessible 
until they no longer have the ability to reduce that 
risk. Consider the patient who chooses a provider 
for treatment of a sensitive, personal nature be-
cause the provider does not participate in an HIE, 
only to learn at a later date that the provider sub-
sequently made his patient files available through 
a medical records network. The same concern may 
arise when records in a regional health informa-
tion exchange are included in a statewide network. 
Patients who are willing to include their medical 
information in a local HIE may want to prevent, 
or to limit, the dissemination of that information 
through a regional, state or national health infor-
mation network.
 
Patient Control of Information-Sharing
New York State has made two critical policy 
decisions in creating the state’s electronic health 
information exchange infrastructure. The first 
was to allow patient information to be uploaded 
to the network without patient consent. The 
second was to adopt an “all-or-nothing” model of 
sharing information.67 When a patient consents to 
allow a provider to access her medical informa-
tion through an HIE, that provider will receive 
any and all information contained in her record, 
regardless of who provided the treatment; the 
type of care received; the date it was provided; or 
even its relevance to current medical treatment. 
Consent automatically confers access to all infor-
mation in the patient’s record, including sub-
stance abuse treatment, mental health conditions, 
abortion and other reproductive health care, and 
testing and treatment for sexually transmitted in-
fections. In addition, consent is generally granted 
to entire facilities; patients cannot specify which 
doctors may—or may not—access their records. 
This kind of blanket consent stands in stark 
contrast to the nuanced controls possible in the 
world of paper records. And despite New York 
Protecting Patient Privacy: StrategieS For regUlatiNg eleCtroNiC HealtH reCordS exCHaNge
Ne w York Civil liBertieS UNioN    15
gRaNUlaR CONTROl OF PaTIENT INFORMaTION
The ability of an electronic data-sharing system to sort and segregate information is often referred to 
as granular control or data segmentation. Patients and providers have the ability to exercise granular 
control over health data when they can specify which pieces of data from a patient’s medical record to 
include or block when that record is conveyed to a third party. In systems capable of granularization, 
personal health information ideally can be sorted by data type (e.g., a blood test, a diagnosis, a 
procedure); by provider (e.g., a gynecologist, a psychologist, an internist; or medical providers vs. office 
staff ); by time range (e.g., between x date and y date, within five years, or for a 24-hour period for 
emergency treatment); and by purpose (e.g., payment, care delivery, quality improvement, clinical 
research or health services research). 
Federal and state law provisions mandating confidentiality for certain types of medical information make 
granularity an essential component of electronic health information exchange. Beyond the confidentiality 
rules that apply to narrow categories of medical information like HIV and substance abuse treatment, 
patients may have a desire to exercise granular control over information that they deem sensitive for a 
variety of reasons, including fear of discrimination or misuse, a personal preference for privacy, a valuation 
of fundamental autonomy, or because the information is erroneous. Likewise, providers may appreciate 
granularity so that they can limit the vast amount of information they may be expected to review for any 
given patient. On the other hand, providers may have concerns about the level of confidence they can 
have in relying on an “incomplete” medical record where certain information may be restricted from their 
view at the request of a patient.
Allowing for granular control in health information exchange presents technological, conceptual, and 
implementation challenges that policymakers must carefully grapple with to achieve a balance that 
satisfies legal requirements, the need for patient acceptance and engagement, and provider confidence.70
State and federal law requirements that providers 
share only that information which is medically 
necessary for the patient’s current treatment, 
New York’s current policies and procedures do 
not allow the sharing of information to be lim-
ited in this way. It is possible, however, to realize 
the public health benefits of an electronic health 
information network without requiring patients 
to completely surrender control over information 
contained in their medical histories. These two 
interests are not irreconcilable; they must  
be balanced. 
This principle of balance informs an emerging na-
tional model regarding the collection and dissemi-
nation of medical records in electronic information 
networks.68 This model recognizes that patients 
must have discretion regarding which informa-
tion is shared with what health care providers. And 
patient choice, in this context, requires the capacity 
to segregate data. Policy technicians use the phrase 
“granular control” to describe this concept.69 
After exhaustive deliberations—including no fewer 
than nine public hearings conducted over the course 
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PaTIENT CONTROl OVER SENSITIVE HEalTH INFORMaTION
Once a patient consents to allow a provider to gain access to his or her medical records, the provider 
gains access to everything in that patient’s records—there is no way to ensure that the provider only 
sees information that is relevant to current treatment. This “all-or-nothing” approach to data sharing 
forces patients to choose between giving a current provider access to their medical records and 
maintaining future control over sensitive health information. Once sensitive information enters into 
the patient’s general medical record, there is no way to exclude it again. When patients are unable 
to exercise granular control over information in their health records, there are serious ramifications. 
Sexual Assault Care
Consider, for example, a patient who was raped in her twenties, and briefly took antidepressants 
to cope with trauma. New York’s all-or-nothing system does not allow her to restrict access to 
this sensitive information to those providers for whom it is medically relevant. If she were to seek 
treatment for a skin condition, she cannot share current medical information with her dermatologist 
without also revealing this traumatic incident in her past. Each time the need for medical care 
arises, she must determine whether or not to provide access to her medical records because her 
assent means informing the provider that she had been the victim of rape.
Reproductive Health Care
Abortion is controversial for some, yet 3 in 10 adult women will have an abortion at some point 
in their lives.73 A woman who terminates a pregnancy may be concerned about making that 
information available to anyone with access to an electronic network that contains her medical 
information. She may want her current medical providers to have access to any information in her 
medical history that may be relevant to her treatment, but she cannot do so without losing the 
power to shield information about her abortion from future providers 10 years hence. 
Substance Abuse Treatment
The level of stigma that attaches to those who have struggled with substance abuse is profound. 
For this reason, information about substance abuse treatment is accorded the most stringent 
confidentiality protection by law. While information about that treatment may be relevant for a 
period of time, it becomes irrelevant for the medical provider treating that patient for a wholly 
unrelated condition 10 sober years later. The indiscriminate release of that medical history could 
undermine both personal and professional relationships, and the potential harm is not limited to 
social stigma. Including information about past treatment opens the door to misuse of medical 
information. A provider may refrain from prescribing medically appropriate pain relief to a patient 
who has been treated for substance abuse many years in the past based upon an assumption that 
the patient is exhibiting “drug-seeking” behavior. 
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THE MINEFIEld OF adOlESCENT CONSENT 
For adolescents and their care providers, the failure to allow for patient control of sensitive medical 
information poses an insurmountable obstacle to the delivery of essential medical care. In New York 
State, minors can consent to specific types of health care, including reproductive health and certain 
mental health treatment, without parental involvement (sometimes referred to as “minor-consented 
services”).75 While parents have a right to access their children’s medical records generally, parents and 
future providers may not obtain information about such minor-consented services, and doctors may 
not share such information, without the minor’s permission. Ideally, a system should allow access only 
by health care providers who have received the minor’s consent, while shielding that information from 
parents who routinely access their child’s other medical records. New York does not allow segregation 
of data in this way. As a consequence, many RHIOs simply exclude the medical records of all minors 
between the ages of 10 and 18 from the network altogether—a practice that protects minors’ privacy 
rights but deprives them of the potential benefits of health information exchange.76 
In the case of a 15-year-old seeking testing and treatment for herpes, for example, his pediatrician would 
like to enter this information in his chart. But the doctor has no way to prevent his patient’s parents 
from gaining access to this information when they request copies of their son’s medical records. In a 
world of paper records, the pediatrician could record this information on separate pages in the file but 
not release the confidential portion of her patient’s records when she provides a copy of the records 
to a parent. In an electronic information-sharing system, the only way to protect this young person’s 
confidentiality is to exclude the patient from the electronic-records system altogether. However, 
excluding only those minors who have exercised their right to consent on their own to certain types of 
medical care would signal—to providers, parents and others—that the minor has exercised that right, 
which then compromises the right. A system that allows for granular control of medical information 
would allow all minors to fully benefit from participation in HIEs, while ensuring that those who need it 
are assured confidentiality when they receive medical care of a sensitive nature. 
of six years—the National Committee on Vital Sta-
tistics (NCVHS) concluded that patients’ confidence 
and trust in the integrity of an electronic health 
information network is essential to its effectiveness; 
and that creating trust in this enterprise requires 
giving patients control over the release of personal 
medical information. In 2010 the chairperson of the 
NCVHS sent a letter to Kathleen Sebelius, secre-
tary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, making a strong case that the capacity to 
segregate (and therefore the ability to restrict) the 
release of patients’ health care information must be 
context specific, and that “granular segregation” of 
that information must be responsive to the specific 
concerns of patients.71 The Office of the National 
Coordinator of Health Information Technology, a 
unit in the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, has taken a position that is consistent with 
the analysis set out in the NCVHS letter.72  
New York policymakers insist that existing 
technological infrastructure does not have the 
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capacity to allow patients to control access to 
medical information by data type, provider, time 
range or purpose. But the vendors of electronic 
health-information technology maintain that the 
capacity to segregate data in health records is well 
within reach.74 The technological and logistical 
challenges of developing this data-segregation ca-
pacity are not insignificant—but neither are these 
challenges insurmountable.  
National experts insist that the capacity to 
achieve granular segregation of patient health 
care information is a key goal—and a critical 
success factor—in the implementation of health 
information networks. Should the federal gov-
ernment mandate as a condition of funding that 
states develop the capacity to segregate patient 
health information—a likely possibility—New 
York State’s electronic health information ex-
change system may find itself out of money and 
lagging well behind the emerging consensus 
regarding best practices.
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Electronic sharing of health records promises significant benefits. Ensuring that patients are able to control who has access to what 
parts of their medical histories is vital to this 
endeavor. Providers and public health advo-
cates consider indispensible unfettered access to 
individual medical records that technology now 
makes possible. 
However, well-established law and policy have rec-
ognized that patients have the right to control access 
to their private medical information. And indeed, 
patients have always controlled access to their medi-
cal records. Whether one doctor even knew that her 
patient was seeing another doctor depended entirely 
on what the patient chose to share. 
Allowing patients to retain a measure of control 
over their medical records will increase confi dence 
in the system’s ability to safeguard confi dentiality. 
Th is, in turn, will likely result in increased patient 
and provider willingness to participate in electronic 
health information exchange.  
It is the position of the NYCLU that the state 
should revisit policy choices that affect the ability 
of patients to control the dissemination of their 
personal medical information. Accordingly, we 
offer 10 specific recommendations designed to ac-
commodate patient concerns, and in turn, create a 
more reliable information-sharing system. 
CoNClUSioN
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reCoMMeNdatioNS
1. Ensure Patient and Provider Control of Access and Information-Sharing. Th e state must require that the electronic 
systems employed by HIEs have the capability to 
sort and segregate medical information in order to 
comply with guaranteed privacy protections of New 
York and federal law. Th e inability to exercise this 
kind of granular control over data poses an intrac-
table barrier to realizing the full benefi ts of health 
information exchange. Th is limitation jeopardizes 
patient confi dence, and it has led to the exclusion of 
young people’s records from the network. Without 
the ability to exercise granular control over data in 
the network, people who receive medical care that 
requires strict confi dentiality—for example, treat-
ment of conditions to which stigma attaches—and 
the providers who deliver that care may choose not 
to share medical records in order to protect privacy. 
Th is increases the risk of harm to both patients and 
to the general public.  
2. Off er Patients the Right to Opt-Out Altogether. Th e state should revisit its decision to upload patient information to 
the system without patient consent. Barring that, the 
state must adopt a policy that would allow patients 
to affi  rmatively opt-out of the system so that their 
medical information is not included in the network. 
Th e state should also ensure that a patient’s identify-
ing information is not accessible by those who have 
not obtained the specifi c consent of the patient. 
Providers who seek access to a patient’s medical 
records do so by accessing a patient locator system 
that contains the names of patients and some other 
identifying information. Patient locator systems vary 
by HIE, with some HIEs utilizing patient addresses. 
For some, like domestic violence survivors, public 
fi gures, crime victims and celebrities, allowing that 
information to be accessible absent consent poses 
a signifi cant risk of harm. For this reason patients 
must be off ered the option of being “unlisted” in 
patient locator systems. 
3. Require Patient Consent Forms to Off er Clear Information-Sharing Options. Th e state should revisit its policy 
on consent to allow greater patient control over how 
medical information is shared. Most consent forms 
used by New York State RHIOs are inadequate. Th ey 
do not make clear that if the patient declines to sign 
the form, their information remains available in 
an emergency—frustrating both patients who want 
only emergency access and those who do not want 
even emergency access. Consent forms should off er 
patients three distinct options: to opt-in and allow 
providers access to their electronic medical records, 
to opt-out except in the event of a medical emer-
gency, or to opt-out altogether. 
4. Require Notice to Patients When Th eir Providers Become Data Suppliers. Th e state must adopt a policy mandating that 
providers notify patients when the provider links 
to HIE. In the absence of consent to upload patient 
information, patients must be notifi ed when infor-
mation about them from their provider initially 
become accessible through an HIE.  
5. Guarantee the Right of Patients to Correct and Amend Information. Current state law allows patients the right 
to review and submit amendments to health infor-
mation held by individual providers.77 Th e practice 
of correction and amendment must be adapted to 
ensure that a correction to any error is automati-
cally sent to any provider who has accessed the 
patient’s medical records through an HIE. With 
paper records, a patient need only correct informa-
22    Ne w York Civil liBertieS UNioN 
Protecting Patient Privacy: StrategieS For regUlatiNg eleCtroNiC HealtH reCordS exCHaNge 
tion in one doctor’s file. But the implementation of 
electronic records exchange amplifies the impact of 
any error, and erroneous information in a medi-
cal file can have a devastating impact on a patient’s 
subsequent care. 
6. Prohibit, and Sanction, the Misuse of Medical Information. The state should adopt a policy that prohibits and strongly 
sanctions the misuse of patient medical informa-
tion obtained through an HIE. Providers misuse 
health information when they use that informa-
tion to discriminate against, mistreat or withhold 
treatment from patients. New York’s all-or-nothing 
system gives providers access to all of a patient’s 
medical records—regardless of how old the infor-
mation or how relevant it is for current treatment. 
State policies have rightly focused attention on the 
potential for breach as the state moves toward an 
integrated statewide network of medical records, 
but have not addressed the potential for the misuse 
of such information. New York must protect pa-
tients from potential bad actors—that small minor-
ity of providers who may abuse information out of 
fear, prejudice or malice. 
7. Mandate Redisclosure Prohibitions for Third Parties. Current state policies do not require HIEs to warn those who access 
patient health information that redisclosing sensi-
tive medical information without patient consent 
violates the law. While some RHIOs provide this 
notice as a matter of course,78 state policy should 
require HIEs to explicitly communicate to third 
parties that redisclosure is prohibited and that 
there are penalties for violating this prohibition.  
8. Prohibit Health Information Exchanges from Selling Data. The New York State Legislature should pass legislation 
prohibiting HIEs from selling patients’ private 
health information. This prohibition should ap-
ply to records with or without a patient’s personal 
identifiers. Medical information must not be used 
to target individuals or providers for promotional 
pitches or advertising campaigns; nor should HIEs 
be allowed to profit from the sales and marketing 
opportunities created by the release of information 
in patients’ medical records.79
9. Carefully Regulate the Use of  Commercially Available Personal Health Records (PHRs). A number of 
commercial vendors now offer patients the ability to 
collect, store and manage their own medical infor-
mation online (such as Microsoft HealthVault80). 
Under existing law, it is unclear to what extent and 
under what circumstances these commercial entities 
are bound by HIPAA or New York State confidenti-
ality laws.81 State law should extend confidentiality 
obligations and protections to private entities that 
offer PHRs. If commercially available health records 
systems are offered to New Yorkers as a way for them 
to access and manage their own health information, 
the state must require that patients be warned of 
privacy risks. Patients must also be given access to 
their records without having to resort to a commer-
cial vendor. 
10. Step Up Public Outreach Efforts. The state should engage in a ro-bust and effective public outreach 
campaign to fully inform New Yorkers about the 
implementation of HIEs. This public outreach and 
education program must not be a mere promotion-
al campaign.82 Patients require a basic understand-
ing of what is at stake, both in terms of risks and 
benefits, before their medical information is linked 
to an HIE. This is particularly important because 
current New York State policy does not require 
consent before linking a patient’s medical records 
to the network, and does not provide patients with 
an option to decline participation. Informed con-
sent must be the cornerstone to health information 
exchange in New York, as has long been the case 
with sharing physical records. Consent cannot be 
considered informed if patients first learn about 
New York’s network when they arrive at their doc-
tor’s office. 
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NYClU’S iNvolveMeNt iN Hie
iMPleMeNtatioN iN NYS 
The New York Civil Liberties Union at-tended one of a series of early stakeholder meetings convened by the New York State 
Department of Health (DOH) in 2007 to garner 
community input about the creation of an elec-
tronic health information exchange infrastruc-
ture. DOH has been the lead agency heading up 
this state effort, but the department delegated 
authority to develop the infrastructure and poli-
cies and procedures governing health information 
exchange to the New York eHealth Collaborative 
(NYeC). NYeC is a non-profit organization that 
was formed in 2006 to guide the development 
of the state’s health information exchange and is 
described as a “public-private partnership.” 
NYeC and the DOH formed the New York State-
wide Collaboration Process (SCP) to guide imple-
mentation and policymaking activities. Th e SCP is 
comprised of six work groups (Consumer and Pro-
vider Engagement, SHIN-NY Architecture, Privacy 
and Security, Public Health, Collaborative Care, 
and EHR Implementation) along with a Policy 
and Operations Council (POC), which reviews the 
activity of the work groups and reports directly to 
DOH and NYeC. 
In 2008, the SCP issued a white paper outlining 
consumer consent policies and procedures, and 
the NYCLU responded to SCP’s call for public 
comment. In response to the NYCLU’s comments, 
and our organization’s expertise regarding minors’ 
right to confi dential health care, the NYCLU was 
invited to participate in a subgroup formed by the 
Privacy and Security Work Group (PSWG), deal-
ing solely with issues of minors’ confi dentiality 
and consent. Th e NYCLU participated in a smaller 
task force formed from that subgroup (the minor 
consent “Tiger Team”), charged with identifying 
solutions to the problem of protecting minors’ 
confi dentiality in HIE. Th e Tiger Team submit-
ted a white paper in July 2010 calling for federal 
guidance on the issue to the Offi  ce of the National 
Coordinator for Health Information Technology 
(ONC). In February 2011, the NYCLU secured 
a position with the PSWG where it advocates on 
behalf of consumer privacy interests in the state’s 
ongoing process of developing privacy and security 
policies and procedures.
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